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The Legal and Criminalistic Aspects of Secret Data 
and Information Collection  
 
 
1. The typology of secret data and information collection 
  
Bearing in mind current national, European and global crime rates as well as 
the globalizing tendencies of organized crime, we can state for certain that the 
traditional, open methods of investigation are not efficient for successful 
criminal prosecution. Against conspired criminal networks working with 
wide-scale distribution of work, using significant human and material resources, 
one can step up successfully only with secret methods of covering, and an 
extensive spectrum of human and technical devices. The detailed criminal 
tactical and criminal technical methodology of these devices and strategies is 
defined by criminalistics. Criminal procedure law provides the legal framework.  
 Act XIX of 1998 on Criminal Procedures (hereinafter the Criminal Procedures 
Law, CPL), form-fitted to Rule of Law requirements, includes the regulations 
for secret data and information collection. This is a novelty in Hungary, as 
there had been no such directions in the criminal procedure codes. The investi-
gating authorities used to act on the basis of secret, internal commands even 
though their operation affected fundamental rights. The breakthrough came 
with Act X of the year 1990 (already annulled by Act CXXV of 1995), which–
at the dawn of the political transition–was the first to regulate secret service 
operations. This was followed by Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, Act C of 
1995 on Customs law, customs procedures, and customs administration, Act 
CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services, and Act XXXII of 1997, on the 
Border Guard Services, and finally the recent modification of the law on 
prosecutor’s office, which gave a detailed authorization for secret information 
collection,. (Altogether, at present there are four agencies performing investiga-
  
 ∗ Dr. univ., Ph.D. Associate Professor, Pécs University Law School Criminal Procedure 
Department, H–7622 Pécs, 48-as tér 1. 
e-mail: fenyvesi@ajk.pte.hu   
184 CSABA FENYVESI 
  
 
tive tasks, including the prosecutor’s office, five secret services, and the interior 
investigation division of the police–all entitled to collect secret information.)  
 Nowadays, two methods can be distinguished in a well-confined manner, 
namely: 
 – secret collection of information (memo-technically SECOLLINF), and 
 – secret obtainment of data (memo-technically SEOBTDAT).  
 
Their differences can be summed up in the following table:  
 
The taxonomic distribution of secret means and methods 
Secret collection of information Secret obtainment of 
data  
Requiring an 
authorisation from a 
judge or the Minister of 
Justice  
No judicial warrant required Requiring a court 
order 
 
Can last until the 
investigation is ordered 
Before and after the investigation 
is ordered (even during the 
investigation!) 





− secret search and 
technical recording of 
private apartments  
− surveillance and 
recording of private 
apartments 
− getting acquainted with 
and recording mail (K-
check) 





− getting acquainted with 
and applying the data 
of Internet or other 
computer 
correspondence 
− the use of an informer, 
undercover operation (+ 
prosecutor’s permit to person 
cooperating) 
− information collection by 
scouting or undercover 
investigator (+ prosecutor’s 
permission) 
− checking data  
− issuing a cover document or 
establishing a cover organisation  
− surveillance of persons, 
premises, buildings, other 
objects, land and vehicles, as 
well as recording sound and 
picture  
− application of traps  
− sample shopping 








− data forwarded by 
means of computer 
systems   
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− controlled shipping  
− victim role play by a policeman  
− establishment of information 
systems 
− tapping in addition to the cases 
which require a permission, 
recording of data discovered 
with technical devices  
− collection of information from 
communication devices and 
other data storage devices which 
require an official permit 
(+prosecutor’s permission) 
 
First, let us review those specific  secret data collection (SEOBTDAT) activities 
which belong under the auspices of the CPL [a)-b)-c) of Paragraph (1) of Section 
200]. This means the following: 
 a) surveillance and recording of events taking place in private apartments by 
means of technical devices, 
 b) getting acquainted with the contents of letters, other postal matters, as 
well as communications forwarded by means of telephone cable or 
other communication systems, and the recording of these by means of 
technical devices, 
 c) getting acquainted with and applying data forwarded and stored by 
computer systems.  
 
In the first category, the investigating authority surveys and records the events 
taking place in the private apartment by means of video(cameras) and listening 
devices (“bugs”, “sound guns”) secretly installed in the interior space, or used 
from the outside. In the second category, the “blocking” of communi-cation 
devices takes place, which includes the “tapping” of faxes, telegrams, and all 
kinds of telephones (hard wire, mobile, etc.), the–to use an old phrase–ferreting 
out and recording of data which will be used as evidence later. Finally, the third 
group contains the secret checking and disclosure of computer data, e-mails, 
internet data, and connections. 
 
As they affect basic human rights (e.g. the privacy of residence or private 
secrets), they can only be applied with a number of restrictions, such as: 
 a) the existence of general basic requirements, 
 b) for a specific goal, 
 c) in relation of special crimes and special circumstances, 
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 d) against particular individuals, 
 e) within time constraints, 
 f) according to strict formal requirements, with a judicial warrant.  
 
Ad a) The application of SEOBTDAT has three general, basic requirements: 
 – necessity (there are sufficient grounds to assume that the obtainment of 
the evidence is hopeless in another way) 
 – proportionality  
– the likeliness of the result. 
 The conditions are conjunctive: all of them need to exist for the application. 
If either one is absent, the secret means cannot be applied. Naturally, this only 
comes up at the point of approving the motion. because afterwards–provided 
that it was successful–it cannot be debated, the absence of any of these does 
not exclude or make the evidence obtained unlawful.  
 
Ad b) Unlike the means, the aims are not very special, we could say they are 
general. It is not difficult to satisfy this restriction as we can list the same aims 
even in the case of open investigative acts; 
– the establishment of the identity of the perpetrator, 
– the establishment of the place of residence of the perpetrator, 
– arresting the perpetrator, 
– uncovering means of evidence. 
 
Ad c) Secret devices can be applied only in relation to special (deliberate) 
criminal acts which pose an outstanding danger to society, or have special 
material or personal conditions. It is fair that the law [Paragraph (1) of Section 
201] lists these; 
 
The crimes or the attempt or the preparation for such crimes need to be  
 – deliberate and to be punished with imprisonment of five years or more, 
furthermore 
 – related to crime spreading across the country borders, 
 – against a minor, 
 – committed serially or is performed through organised commission 
(including habitual commission, in conspiracy or criminal organisation 
as well), 
 – related to drugs or materials constituting drugs, 
 – related to forging banknotes or securities or  
 – committed while being armed.  




Ad d) The secret device cannot be applied against anybody, it can be used only 
in relation of a defined circle. The target person, as the criminalistics term 
goes, is constituted by the following: 
 – primarily the suspect (the comprehensive term “accused” cannot be 
applied here as the secret device can exist exclusively in the investigative 
phase of the criminal procedure) 
 – against the potential suspect (the person who can be suspected of the 
commission of the criminal act according to the data of the investigation 
so far but he has not been informed of this yet; that is, it can be applied 
in the event of the existence of the simple personal suspicion), 
 – it is possible against others as well, if there is information pertaining 
any criminal relationship with individuals of the previous two categories, 
or there are grounds to assume such a relationship (simple suspicion is 
enough for this, too). 
 Among “other individuals” it is a further order of limitation that the above-
listed secret means can only be applied against a lawyer acting as defense 
counsel if there is well-founded suspicion of a criminal act against the counsel 
in connection with the case. This restriction–absolutely correctly–extends to 
the private residence, office, all the telephone lines, communication devices, 
postal and electronic correspondence, as well as all the mail of the attorney. 
Another restrictive institution that is meant to protect the client-attorney privacy 
is that this restriction extends to the consulting rooms of the police detention 
facilities and the penitentiary institutions (including the houses of correction).  
 As a marginal note, we would like to add that it is not necessary to use secret 
means in the consulting rooms of the police detention facilities which are 
separated with a glass-plexi wall, as the defense counsel and the accused usually 
need to almost shout with each other, but at least are forced to talk loudly, thus–
violating thereby the defense’s secret and intimacy–this can be heard within 
ear’s reach.1 
 In connection with the tapping of the defense counsels’ telephone lines, in 
the 1998 case of Kopp vs Switzerland the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECHR).established the violation of Article 8 as the Swiss authorities 
violated the right to privacy and family life when they wiretapped the 
applicant’s conversations in the attorney’s office. (Bírósági Határozatok, 
hereinafter BH 1998/12. 955–957). 
  
 1 For more see more in Fenyvesi, Cs.: A védőügyvéd (The Defense Counsel). Budapest–
Pécs, 2002. 




Ad e) The secret obtainment of data can only take place during the course of 
the investigation: it begins with the ordering of the investigation, and ends with 
the introduction of the documents of the investigation. Within this timeframe it 
can last for 90 days, with one extension for a maximum period of 180 days. 
With the exception of unpostponable cases (periculum in mora), a notice 
ordering investigation is needed, without which the motion for order cannot be 
formally accepted. In establishing the time of the introduction of the documents, 
it is the introduction of the documents to the first accused (if there are more 
than one) that is to be taken into consideration; it is the point until which the secret 
obtainment of data can be performed. If secret means had been used before 
the investigation was ordered, that could be performed lawfully only within 
the framework of secret collection of information (SECOLLINF). If, in the 
meanwhile, the investigation is ordered, the secret collection of information is 
kind of transformed, and only secret obtainment of data (SEOBTDAT) can be 
carried out according to the CPL [Paragraphs (3)–(4) of Section 200]. 
  
Ad f) The most important formal requirement is that the secret data collection 
can be authorised by the court, more precisely the investigator judge, upon 
the prosecutor’s motion. In his motion, the prosecutor, as the master of the 
investigation (dominus litis) has to detail the following: 
 – the name of the prosecutorial body, the investigating authority, 
 – the date the investigation was ordered, 
 – the number of the case, 
 – if there is or has been secret information collection,, who performed it, 
what data has been obtained, 
 – the place of the planned performance of secret data collection, in the case 
of telephone tapping, the telephone number (either hard wire or mobile), 
 – the name and identification particulars of the person affected (the target 
person), 
 – the name of the means and methods, 
 – the starting and ending date of the planned period, with the hour and 
day indicated, 
 – the existence of the restricting conditions detailed under points a)–b)–
c)–d)–e), 
 – in case of an unpostponable (emergency) order, its reason and time, 
 – the documents providing grounds for the motion attached, 
 – upon a motion for extension the documents emerging since the earlier 
authorisation. 
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 The investigating judge makes a decision about the motion within 72 hours. 
She/he may reject, fully or partially approve it. In case the motion is approved 
the judge defines what kind of secret means and methods can be used, against 
whom, between what time constraints [Paragraph (4) of Section 203].  
 In unpostponable (emergency) cases, not only the judge but also the 
prosecutor may order secret data collection for a period of 72 hours, however, 
the motion for authorisation is also to be put forward at the same time. If the 
court turns it down, there is no room for unpostponable order on the grounds of 
unchanged factual basis, and–as referred to earlier in connection with legal 
remedies–there lies no appeal.  
 If we take a look at the six restrictions listed above, we can see that apart from 
the first two (a–b) posing general specifications, the violation of the other four 
points (c–d–e–f) all make the data obtained thus unlawful (excluding it from the 
chain of evidence), thus they fall into the category of excluded evidence. We 




2. The execution of secret obtainment of data, getting acquainted with 
and using its results  
 
Secret data collection itself is carried out by the police and the special sub-
units of the national security services, with whom–in ways specified in separate 
legal regulations–the telecommunication, postal, computer network service 
providers are obliged to cooperate with.  
 The prosecutor and the head of the investigating authority have several 
obligations in connection with secret data collection. On the one hand, he/she 
has to terminate secret data collection without delay if [Paragraph (3) of 
Section 204] 
 a) in the event of unpostponable order, the court rejected the motion, 
 b) it has fulfilled its objective determined in the permission or warrant, 
 c) the period of time determined in the permission or has lapsed, 
 d) the investigation has been terminated, 
 e) it is obvious that no result can be expected from its further appli-
cation. 
 With respect to these, the law enumerates excluded evidence only in case 
of points a) and e)–in Paragraph (4) of Section 206–however, our opinion is 
that the unlawfulness prevails within the circle of all the obligations described 
here and below.  
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 The same individuals also have an obligation to eliminate all data that has 
not importance for the goal, and data recorded in connection with individuals 
who are not involved in the case. An additional requirement in connection 
with the secret data obtained subsequently, not permitted by the judge, in an 
unpostponable manner, is that they are to be destroyed not within 8 days but 
without delay [Paragraph (4) of Section 204]. All these also belong to the 
category of excluded evidence. 
 Third, they have continuous data protection and confidentiality obligations, 
according to the regulations of the state secret and service secret law. Upon 
the request of the investigating judge authorizing secret obtainment of data, 
the prosecutor is obligated to present the data obtained so far. As a control of 
legality, she/he examines its application and should it be established that the 
terms of the permission have been transgressed, she/he may terminate it–with 
a final and binding resolution–and in the case of other violation law, may 
terminate the secret data collection [Paragraph (3) of Section 205]. 
 Fourth, it is the obligation of the prosecutor to notify all parties affected 
by the secret data collection provided that no criminal procedure has been 
initiated against them and it would not endanger the success of the criminal 
procedure. The notification is to be made only if both conditions are satisfied. 
The measure often contested in the literature is a constitutional state require-
ment, while we can definitely expect that the person notified about the tapping 
of his phone will fear using the telephone all his life even though he might 
have only been “affected” by the case without committing or even planning 
anything unlawful. Thus we consider the application of the legal requirements 
acceptable only with very serious restrictions. 
 It is already the fifth obligation that the head of the prosecutorial or 
investigating authority is to draw up a signed report of the execution of the 
secret obtainment of data, which contains   
 – its progress, 
 – what means and methods were applied, for how long and where, 
 – who was affected by it, 
 – the place and time of the source of the data not destroyed 
 – the fact of the achievement of the goal, or the reason in case of its 
absence[Paragraph (5) of Section 204]. 
 The report is unconditionally necessary for the prosecutor if she/he endeavors 
to use the result of secret data collection as documentary evidence in the open 
criminal procedure. Otherwise, it can be made evidence only if it cannot be 
replaced by anything else. In this case, by its application, the state secret nature 
of the data ceases, except if the data is a state secret regardless of the manner of 
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obtainment. In this case, the cancellation permission of the master of the state 
secret is also required. 
 The permission is to be attached to the documents of the investigation to-
gether with the motion for permission and the resolution of the court granting 
permission (the three documents) [Paragraphs (1)–(2) of Section 206].   
 Data obtained during the course of secret data collection, before ordering 
the investigation can also be made into chain of evidence if the master of the 
secret cancels the state secret classification and if it meets the general 
requirements listed under points a–f, and if the purpose of use is the same as 
the original goal of secret obtainment of data or secret collection of information 
[Paragraph (4) of Section 206].  
 
Finally, here is a table about the comparison of (the execution) of secret 
collection of information requiring a permit (SECOLLINF) and secret data 
obtainment (SEOBTDAT) activity. 
 
Secret collection of information  
 Secret collection of 
information 
(SECOLLINF)                
Secret obtainment of data 
  (SEOBTDAT) 
Legal basis  − Police Act (XXXIV of year 
1994) 
− State Security Services Act 
(CXXV of 1995) 
− Border Guard Act (XXXII of  
1997) 
− Customs Law (C of  
− 1995) 
− Act on the public prosecutor (V 
of 1972) 
CPL 
Party ordering Judge and Minister of Justice  Court (investigating judge)  
Time of 
application  
− before the investigation is 
ordered 
− after the investigation is 
ordered  
− during the investigation  
− until the introduction of 
documents 
Period of time of 
application  
90 days that can be extended by 90 days 
Method, means − secret search and technical 
recording of private residence  − the surveillance and recording 
of a private residence  
− the technical surveillance of 
a private residence  − gathering and recording 
mail, telecommunication 
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− mail (K-check) − gathering and digitally 
recording telecommunication 
messages  − gathering and using the data of 
Internet or other computer 
technical correspondence  







range of criminal 
acts  
− Police Law Points a)-j) of 
Paragraph (3) and Paragraph 
(4) of Section 69  − National security interest as 
well  
CPL Points a)-g) of 
Paragraph (1) of Section 201 
Against whom 
(target person) 
“potential accused”  the accused and persons in 
criminal relationship with the 
accused  
Hopeless in other ways (necessary) General condition  
 + proportional (would 
propose disproportional 
difficulty in another way) 
+ the result is rendered 
probable  
Police Law Paragraph (1) of 
Section 73 
CPL Paragraph (3) of 
Section 204 
the achievement of the goal 
the expiration of the deadline 
no result can be expected 
subsequently, the judge did not allow emergency  
Termination 
+ is unlawful for some reason + the investigation was 
terminated  
Destruction of data  data without interest for the goal, and data recorded in connection 
with individuals not involved in the case 
Use as evidence inclusion into report document and attachment to investigation 
documents  
Subsequent 
notification of the 
party affected  
None the prosecutor notifies the 
affected parties if no criminal 
procedure was launched 
against and is not 
endangering the success of 
the procedure  
 
 
3. Secret collection of information not requiring a judge’s permission  
 
As mentioned above, to prevent, uncover, and interrupt criminal activity, to 
establish the identity of the perpetrator, to locate wanted criminals, to establish 
 THE LEGAL AND CRIMINALISTIC ASPECTS OF SECRET DATA… 193 
  
 
their place of residence, and to obtain evidence, the police–within the 
constraints of Act XXXIV of 1994 on the police–can collect secret data. 
 During the criminal procedure, the data obtained during the course of secret 
information collection–which is possible–as well as the identity of the person 
cooperating with the police, the mere fact and technical details of information 
collection constitute a secret until used as means of evidence. 
 The aim of the application of the secret criminal-technical means is also 
criminal data collection, or we could say, criminal intelligence service. In a 
wider sense, criminal intelligence service is the information collection activity 
carried out under cover, in a hidden manner (conspiring), of an offensive 
nature, within the framework of means and methods defined by law. 
 In a narrower sense, criminal intelligence service is the integration of 
official police personnel in criminally significant positions, projects, areas, and 
regard to people in order to obtain data necessary for the investigation).  
 
The types of secret information collection not requiring a judicial warrant: 
 a) the police may employ an informer or a fiduciary person, 
 b) may collect information undercover, 
 c) to cover the cooperating person, as well as to cover under cover operations 
can issue and use a cover document, can establish and maintain a cover business, 
 d) can survey persons who can be suspected of the commission of the 
criminal act as well as persons in relation with the above (so-called target 
persons), as well as the premises, buildings, and other projects, section of 
land or road, vehicles, events that can be associated with the criminal act, can 
collect information about it, and can record the findings with technical devices 
suitable for the recording of sound, picture, other signs or traces,  
 e) in order to uncover the perpetrator of a criminal act or in the interest of 
proving, is allowed to apply a trap–that does not cause damage or harm to one’s 
health–can perform sample or fake or purchasing, may carry out controlled 
shipment, and can engage in victim role-play by a policeman, 
 f) may establish information systems, 
 g) apart from the cases requiring a permission, they can tap and record the 
findings with technical means (e.g. conversation in a park), 
 h) may collect information from telecommunication systems requiring 
official permissions and other data storage facilities. 
 
The police can conclude secret cooperation agreements with natural persons or 
legal entities occurring in the above enumeration, as well as organisations 
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without a legal entity (in practise, most often with the informer), and can give 
material remuneration–even in foreign currency.  
 At the expense of its own budget the police can establish and maintain cover 
businesses indicated under point c) according to the legal regulations with 
respect to business entities or private enterprises.. 
 
 A special combination of secret service devices is the so-called undercover 
agent and his activity. Due to its existence and human nature, it is considered a 
criminal tactical device rather, at the same time, as he is planning to uncover a 
criminal act as a flagrant delict, thus setting a “trap” to the real perpetrator, 
she/he is also in the role of an “agent provocateur”. Nowadays, the provocateur 
is used mostly the fight against drug crimes. The reason the provocateur is 
needed in these cases is that drug-related criminal acts typically do not have a 
victim, there is no accuser at the police, no party filing a complaint. Thus 
the undercover agents pose as buyers, uncovering the drug dealers with test 
purchases.  
 Notwithstanding its use in criminalistics use, we would like to mention the 
theoretical, ethical and possible criminal law liability misgivings in connection 
with the provocateur. As we have pointed out earlier–in these cases the police 
practically sets a trap for the target person(s). They create a situation in which the 
target person thinks that the provocateur is an accomplice, that is the situation 
is, so to say, “ideal” for the commission of the crime. The classical example of 
the provocateur is the undercover policewoman who poses as a prostitute in 
the street, or an police officer posing as a drug dealer.  
 The main ethical problem in connection with the provocateur is posed by 
the possibility that the provocateur might even get the target person to commit 
a criminal act that he would not have committed by himself. In this case, the 
investigation did not uncover but create a criminal act, as the provocateur is 
able to directly influence the target person. The correct attitude is that the 
police should establish the situation favourable for the commission of the criminal 
act, but the decision needs to be made by the target person independently, 
without the influence of the provocateur. 
 
 
4. Secret information collection requiring a judicial warrant  
 
Secret information collection requiring a judicial warrant may have the following 
types: 
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 a) searching a private residence in secret (secret house search ), recording 
the findings by technical means, 
 b) surveying and recording the events taking place in a private residence 
with technical means, 
 c) reading letters, other mail, as well as the contents of communication 
forwarded by means of telephone wire or a telecommunication, and 
recording it that by means of technical devices (e.g. telephone tapping). 
 
The police can use these special (so-called operative) means only during the 
persecution of crimes of outstanding dangerousness. If they  
 a) can be associated with international crime, 
 b) are aimed against an child, 
 c) are realized serially or by organized commission, 
 d) are related to drugs or materials constituting drugs, 
 e) are related to forging money or securities, 
 f) are realized by armed commission, 
 g) are of terrorist nature, 
 h) seriously disturb public safety. 
 
 
5. Particular secret criminal technical devices for information collection  
 
The different secret tapping, surveillance and search activities are carried out 
by the investigating authorities with special criminal technical devices as listed 
in the appendix of 135/1997. Government Decree 135/1997 (VII. 29.)  
They are the following: 
 a) tapping devices; 
 b) secret visual surveillance devices; 
 c) secret entry devices; 
 d) other criminal technical devices. 
 
ad a) Any electronic, mechanical or other device, method, “technology”, or 
software can be a tapping device if used to access secret information without 
the knowledge of those taking part in the communication, provided that they 
possess  one of the following features: 
 aa) It have been designed, or produced for the secret tapping, forwarding, or 
recording of direct speech, or or equipments that can be used for such purposes 
without significant transformation. Thus especially  
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 – wall (contact) microphones and stethoscopes provided with electronic 
amplifiers 
 – tapping systems using laser or infra red radiation, or based on ultra sound 
principle, 
 – miniature transmitters that can be built in or may be remote controlled, 
and their special receivers, 
 – small-size transmitters built into different hiding devices or that can be 
hidden under clothing, the receivers and sound recording devices, 
 – miniature sound-recording devices with a recording capacity of over 10 
hours, 
 – high-sensitivity parabola- and gun microphones, 
 – sub-miniature electret microphones and acoustic probes. 
 ab) Equipment that has been designed or produced for secret gathering,  
forwarding, or recording of data stored on digital or analogue information 
facilities and/or processing computers, computer or other devices, or information 
carriers used with them, or or equipments that can be used for such purposes 
without significant transformation. 
 ac) Equipment that has been designed or produced for secret tapping of 
telecommunication systems forwarding hard-line and/or wireless speech and 
non-speech information or equipments that can be used for such purposes 
without significant transformation.. 
  
ad b) Any optical, mechanical, electronic and other device or accessory, as 
well as a software operating these can be a secret visual surveillance devices, 
provided that it possesses  one of the following features: 
 ba) Equipment that have been designed or produced for secret surveillance 
or recording , or for the forwarding and processing of the information obtained 
thereby, or equipments that can be used for such purposes without significant 
transformation. Thus especially: 
 – small-sized, high resolution and sensitivity CCD cameras and accessories, 
 – miniature cameras and accessories that can be hidden into hiding devices 
or under clothing, 
 – video sign forwarding devices operating in micro-wave range, and their 
receivers, 
 – video sign forwarding devices using the electric network, and their receivers, 
 – fibrescopes with small entry openings, and systems using glass fibre optics 
enabling secret surveillance, and adapters enabling connection to cameras or 
video cameras. 
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 bb) Equipments that operate under restricted light conditions (i.e. do not 
require secondary lighting) and contain special photo-multiplying tubes or 
optical elements. Especially light-enhancing devices that can be used for night 
photography and video recording . 
 bc) Special night vision devices operating in infra red range. 
 
ad c) Secret entry devices are mechanical, electronic, optical and software 
devices that have been produced for the purpose of secretly entering closed 
premises (enclosed area of land, building, vehicle, etc.), provided that they 
possess  one of the following features: 
 – devices, “technologies” and accessories that aredesigned and produced 
for the replacement of the proper opening device of locks, padlocks, bolts, 
etc. operating on the basis of mechanical, electronic or other principles, for 
destructive and destruction-free opening, 
 – devices and software that is developed to penetrate electronic security 
systems. 
 
ad d) Other secret service devices include: 
 da) coding or crypting devices, 
 db) communication systems that can be hidden under clothing, equipped with 
a wireless ear piece, 
 dc) miniature transmitters and special receivers that can be used for 
positioning. 
 
In our opinion, the latter may have a play a significant role in combatting car 
thefts with the use of the so-called “beeper”.2 
 The head of the investigating authority terminates the use of the special 
devices promptly if the its objective has been accomplished, if the time frame 
within the court order has been transgressed, if no result can be expected 
from its further application, or if the application ordered through preliminary 
emergency procedures was not authorised by the judicial authorities. 
 From all secret service expenses, probably, the largest amount is spent on 
Costs may reach, 15–20 billion EUR annually, primarily paid by the USA and 
Great Britain. It was revealed in 1999 that an American tapping system under 
the cover name “Echelon” was able to survey every civilian satellite, every under-
sea cable, as well as Internet mail and sound communication. The American secret 
  
 2 For more see more Gremela, Z.: A titkos információgyűjtésről (About the secret 
collection of information). Rendészeti Szemle, 1993. No. 3.  
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service got as far as “convincing” the largest software manufacturers, Microsoft, 
Lotus, and Netscape to harmonize their export Internet products with American 
regulations. Namely, only to use coding that can be decoded and tapped without 
any particular effort. 
 
 
As a closing idea 
 
It is clear both from the above-described criminal procedural legal framework, 
and from the criminalistics arsenal–and within that, criminal-technical and 
tactical means–that the possibilities for secret data collection are given for 
professionals. From this point on the only question is who is going to operate 
them and with what efficiency.  
 
